

Appendix:

Though party polarization in Congress and lobbying do not appear to be overly correlated, this appendix provides a model including a lagged measure of each dependent variable as additional evidence that results are not a result of auto-correlation and over-time-trends. Adding a lag, combined with inconsistent lobbying from firms, results in dropping from 980 observations in the data to just 640 observations. In short, adding a lag drops nearly 1/3 of the observations from the dataset. The results here are weak and show very little statistical significance. Partisan polarization, in particular, while still having a large effect size, just misses the traditional p-value of .05 for statistical significance. However, it is well established that while adding a lagged value of the dependent variable improves model fit, however, it also frequently results in the disappearance of the original substantive effects of other independent variables (Achen 2000).

Incident Rate Ratios Time Series Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of the Number of Lobbyists Hired to Approach Congress, Bureaucracies, and the Whitehouse

	Congress	Congress Model 2	Bureaucracy	Bureaucracy Model 2	Whitehouse	Whitehouse Model 2
Lagged Dependent Variable	1.032** (0.004)	1.032** (0.004)	1.033** (0.002)	1.034** (.003)	1.181** (0.046)	1.181** (0.046)
Farm Bill Year	0.790* (0.104)	0.794 (0.104)	0.885 (0.135)	0.889 (0.135)	0.676 (0.236)	0.678 (0.237)
Average Polarization	5.597 (6.063)	5.848 (6.337)	0.361 (0.454)	0.369 (0.463)	1.438 (3.938)	1.472 (4.033)
Divided Congress	0.882 (0.148)	0.884 (0.149)	0.778 (0.149)	0.774 (0.149)	0.960 (0.371)	0.958 (0.371)
Unified Government	1.422* (0.236)	1.409* (0.234)	1.374 (0.255)	1.383 (0.256)	1.609 (0.625)	1.612 (0.626)
Committee Connections	1.007 (0.024)	1.063** (0.024)	1.009 (0.010)	1.069 (0.031)	0.980 (0.026)	1.014 (0.137)
Revenue, Normalized	1.122** (0.018)	1.179** (0.030)	1.113** (0.228)	1.176** (0.039)	1.593** (0.122)	1.631** (0.196)
Connections & Revenue Interact	---	0.993* (0.003)	---	0.993* (0.003)	---	0.996 (0.014)
Number of Firms Lobbying	1.016** (0.004)	1.016** (0.004)	1.013** (0.004)	1.013** (0.004)	1.023* (0.011)	1.023* (0.011)
Number of Agriculture Hearings	0.988* (0.006)	0.988* (0.006)	0.983** (0.006)	0.983** (0.006)	0.966* (0.014)	0.966* (0.014)
Congress Lobbying	---	---	1.051** (0.003)	1.050** (0.003)	1.008 (0.007)	1.008 (0.007)
Bureaucracy Lobbying	1.053** (0.003)	1.053** (0.003)	---	---	1.047** (0.006)	1.047** (0.006)

Whitehouse Lobbying	0.863** (0.022)	0.863** (0.022)	1.032 (0.025)	1.032 (0.025)	---	---
2007 Law Change Dummy	0.517** (0.079)	0.516** (0.079)	0.612** (0.103)	0.606** (0.102)	0.169** (0.071)	0.169** (0.071)
Constant	0.004** (0.003)	0.002** (0.002)	0.056** (0.054)	0.035** (0.034)	0.001** (0.002)	0.001** (0.001)
N	4,680	4,680	4,680	4,680	4,680	4,680
Wald Chi-Square	2152.55**	2164.06**	1496.75**	1502.75**	306.30**	306.80**
Log Likelihood	-5036.292	-5033.077	-4184.746	-4182.5	-721.883	-721.850

Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$

Works Cited

Achen, Christopher H. 2000. "Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables." In *Political Methodology Section*, Los Angeles. <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Achen.2000.LDVstealingExplanPower.pdf>.