Farmed Out: Agricultural Lobbying in a Polarized Congress
Forthcoming. Oxford University Press
Please note: The manuscript was originally titled, "What's Cooking in Congress? Interest Group Lobbying and the Construction of Food and Agricultural Policy in an Era of Party Polarization. However, in collaboration with my editor, we have updated the title to something we both believe is a little snappier.
Interest groups have a tremendous impact on public policy in two important ways. First, they effectively become adjunct staffers by providing members of Congress with the necessary information to write legislation. Second, they relay to members relevant electoral information about the particular ramifications of various legislative proposals on their constituents. Of course, none of this is done for free. In return, lobbying groups influence the content of policy that affects their own agendas.
Farmed Out uses U.S. agricultural policy as a vehicle to develop a theory explaining how the rapidly polarizing political environment has altered the role of interest groups in Washington. Agricultural policy is one of the most important and appropriate areas of substance for such a book. U.S. agricultural policy impacts the livelihood of millions, the success of thousands of companies, the implementation (or lack thereof) of nationwide conservation efforts, and the diet, health, and pocketbooks of hundreds of millions of Americans (and America’s trading partners).
This book argues that polarization has given interest groups greater influence over policy content, particularly among their ideological and partisan allies. Ironically, that same partisan polarization regularly frustrates the capacity of groups to push Washington forward on policy change in a timely fashion, especially in the case of low salience legislation where bipartisan collaboration matters most. Not only is such bipartisanship in decline, but also financial investment in congressional capacity for research and fact-finding is at a historical low. Congress’s Standing Committees no longer maintain bipartisan staff, and committee chairs often keep minority party members deliberately in the dark on legislative content. In response to the changing political climate, the book answers the questions: How have interest groups, who still seek influence, modified their strategies in response to this newly polarized and information-sparse political climate? And, what implications does this have for interest groups’ influence on the content of policy?
Farmed Out answers these questions by looking at lobbying behavior in the agricultural sector over two decades to discover changing patterns. In order to identify changes in lobbying behavior over time, the book relies on a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches -- within-case analysis and statistical analysis, including the use of an original dataset of for-profit firms lobbying in the agriculture sector, created by combining Lobbying Disclosure Act data on lobbying interest groups with data on corporate location and profits. Analysis of firms establishes that lobbying behavior has, indeed, changed in predictable and significant ways in response to polarization. Specifically, interest groups have increased the lobbying they direct toward Congress, but not toward bureaucracies or the White House. This is notable because, if lobbying were simply increasing, writ large, over time, we would expect to see increases in lobbying activities directed toward all institutions. However, this is not the case. Instead, lobbying directed toward Congress has increased, without similar increases toward the White House and Bureaucracy. This finding confirms the prediction that congressional polarization has major implications for interest group involvement in policy.
Expanding on the finding that corporations have increased their lobbying of Congress, the book looks more broadly at all interest groups lobbing on agricultural issues during the same time frame. Analysis of a second, inclusive, all-interest-group lobbying dataset, paired with interviews with lobbyists and legislative staffers, shows that interest groups, which have always provided members of Congress with both policy and electoral information, have not only increased their advocacy efforts in Congress, but in doing so, have also begun to provide a new type of subsidy to members of Congress: a negotiation subsidy. Lobbying groups have taken on the task of negotiating across partisan lines as legislators find themselves unable to so. A legislative environment characterized by polarization and weakened congressional capacity fundamentally expands and changes the role of interest groups. Quantitative data suggest that polarization has led to an increase in the quantity of lobbying directed toward Congress as an institution. Interviews indicate that interest groups also have taken on new responsibilities in their quest to influence policy in this highly polarized environment. Groups now provide, not only information, but also political cover for members of Congress. They do this by pre-forming cross-partisan coalitions among their own legislative allies. Such efforts, in turn, provide members of Congress with more political cover to justify their own position-taking. Interest groups also negotiate between the members of Congress themselves, trekking from office to office – or, more likely, texting and emailing between offices – to communicate potential policy compromises and their relative acceptability among potential winning coalition members.
The book also addresses the implications of changing lobbying behavior on public policy. I offer a detailed analysis of changes in the agricultural policy subsystem, and how political scientists, as well as consumers writ large, should anticipate the role of groups in influencing future food and farm policy, which in turn, determines policies such as food stamps, crop subsidies, crop insurance, and environmental conservation. One major implication is an increase in the frequency of “unholy alliances” forming among agricultural producers, food industry associations, and assorted sectoral interest groups. Polarization and the need to form cross-cutting coalitions required to pass a bill likely, for example, have pushed hunger advocates to pair more frequently with industry associations like the National Beverage Association and the Grocers Manufacturers Association. In short, while ideological purity and partisan cohesion may be in high demand for members of Congress (and their campaign backers), its value has never been lower for interest groups hoping to achieve legislative success.
Farmed Out is expansive in turning attention to the substantive impacts that polarization has on policy development. Specifically, the book demonstrates how party polarization expands and alters the role that interest groups play in policy construction and the negotiation process. This expanded view regarding the roll of lobbying in policy making is departure from existing studies concerned with polarization and gridlock, or with lobbying as a form of political insurance. It illustrates that interest groups have adapted their strategies and, consequently, become even more powerful in their influence. Farmed Out points to the importance of behind the scenes coalition building in the policy process and how these often-unnoticed processes shape public policy for better or worse.
Interest groups have a tremendous impact on public policy in two important ways. First, they effectively become adjunct staffers by providing members of Congress with the necessary information to write legislation. Second, they relay to members relevant electoral information about the particular ramifications of various legislative proposals on their constituents. Of course, none of this is done for free. In return, lobbying groups influence the content of policy that affects their own agendas.
Farmed Out uses U.S. agricultural policy as a vehicle to develop a theory explaining how the rapidly polarizing political environment has altered the role of interest groups in Washington. Agricultural policy is one of the most important and appropriate areas of substance for such a book. U.S. agricultural policy impacts the livelihood of millions, the success of thousands of companies, the implementation (or lack thereof) of nationwide conservation efforts, and the diet, health, and pocketbooks of hundreds of millions of Americans (and America’s trading partners).
This book argues that polarization has given interest groups greater influence over policy content, particularly among their ideological and partisan allies. Ironically, that same partisan polarization regularly frustrates the capacity of groups to push Washington forward on policy change in a timely fashion, especially in the case of low salience legislation where bipartisan collaboration matters most. Not only is such bipartisanship in decline, but also financial investment in congressional capacity for research and fact-finding is at a historical low. Congress’s Standing Committees no longer maintain bipartisan staff, and committee chairs often keep minority party members deliberately in the dark on legislative content. In response to the changing political climate, the book answers the questions: How have interest groups, who still seek influence, modified their strategies in response to this newly polarized and information-sparse political climate? And, what implications does this have for interest groups’ influence on the content of policy?
Farmed Out answers these questions by looking at lobbying behavior in the agricultural sector over two decades to discover changing patterns. In order to identify changes in lobbying behavior over time, the book relies on a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches -- within-case analysis and statistical analysis, including the use of an original dataset of for-profit firms lobbying in the agriculture sector, created by combining Lobbying Disclosure Act data on lobbying interest groups with data on corporate location and profits. Analysis of firms establishes that lobbying behavior has, indeed, changed in predictable and significant ways in response to polarization. Specifically, interest groups have increased the lobbying they direct toward Congress, but not toward bureaucracies or the White House. This is notable because, if lobbying were simply increasing, writ large, over time, we would expect to see increases in lobbying activities directed toward all institutions. However, this is not the case. Instead, lobbying directed toward Congress has increased, without similar increases toward the White House and Bureaucracy. This finding confirms the prediction that congressional polarization has major implications for interest group involvement in policy.
Expanding on the finding that corporations have increased their lobbying of Congress, the book looks more broadly at all interest groups lobbing on agricultural issues during the same time frame. Analysis of a second, inclusive, all-interest-group lobbying dataset, paired with interviews with lobbyists and legislative staffers, shows that interest groups, which have always provided members of Congress with both policy and electoral information, have not only increased their advocacy efforts in Congress, but in doing so, have also begun to provide a new type of subsidy to members of Congress: a negotiation subsidy. Lobbying groups have taken on the task of negotiating across partisan lines as legislators find themselves unable to so. A legislative environment characterized by polarization and weakened congressional capacity fundamentally expands and changes the role of interest groups. Quantitative data suggest that polarization has led to an increase in the quantity of lobbying directed toward Congress as an institution. Interviews indicate that interest groups also have taken on new responsibilities in their quest to influence policy in this highly polarized environment. Groups now provide, not only information, but also political cover for members of Congress. They do this by pre-forming cross-partisan coalitions among their own legislative allies. Such efforts, in turn, provide members of Congress with more political cover to justify their own position-taking. Interest groups also negotiate between the members of Congress themselves, trekking from office to office – or, more likely, texting and emailing between offices – to communicate potential policy compromises and their relative acceptability among potential winning coalition members.
The book also addresses the implications of changing lobbying behavior on public policy. I offer a detailed analysis of changes in the agricultural policy subsystem, and how political scientists, as well as consumers writ large, should anticipate the role of groups in influencing future food and farm policy, which in turn, determines policies such as food stamps, crop subsidies, crop insurance, and environmental conservation. One major implication is an increase in the frequency of “unholy alliances” forming among agricultural producers, food industry associations, and assorted sectoral interest groups. Polarization and the need to form cross-cutting coalitions required to pass a bill likely, for example, have pushed hunger advocates to pair more frequently with industry associations like the National Beverage Association and the Grocers Manufacturers Association. In short, while ideological purity and partisan cohesion may be in high demand for members of Congress (and their campaign backers), its value has never been lower for interest groups hoping to achieve legislative success.
Farmed Out is expansive in turning attention to the substantive impacts that polarization has on policy development. Specifically, the book demonstrates how party polarization expands and alters the role that interest groups play in policy construction and the negotiation process. This expanded view regarding the roll of lobbying in policy making is departure from existing studies concerned with polarization and gridlock, or with lobbying as a form of political insurance. It illustrates that interest groups have adapted their strategies and, consequently, become even more powerful in their influence. Farmed Out points to the importance of behind the scenes coalition building in the policy process and how these often-unnoticed processes shape public policy for better or worse.
